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The forfeiture rule in insurance contract law was designed to be draconian in its effect. Such 
rules often generate hard cases. The challenge to the status quo in the litigation comes not 
only from consideration of the rule itself but also from its compatibility with the Human 
Rights Act 1998. The strict nature of the rule was viewed as necessary to deter insurance 
fraud, and to reflect the special nature of the insurance claims process. We show in this piece 
that both of these factors are misunderstood. First, the forfeiture rule is but a tiny piece in the 
market, administrative and legal processes that regulate the level of insurance fraud. 
Secondly, similar issues arise in other areas of contract law, and the responses there better 
reflect the complex interactions of contractual and non-contractual behaviours expected of 
sophisticated market participants. The picture that emerges of the forfeiture rule is one in 
which its benefits have been seriously over-estimated, without proper consideration of less 
intrusive approaches. 
 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
 
The forfeiture rule in insurance contract law is of ancient origin and simply stated: an 
insured that is fraudulent in the presentation of its claim loses the entirety of the claim 
under an insurance policy, and not merely the dishonest part. Despite its antiquity, the 
limits of this principle have been the subject of considerable litigation since the turn of 
the millennium, with notable contributions from Lord Mance.  
The recent development of the forfeiture rule is an archetype in the remaking of modern 
commercial law. It is a mixture of law and policy, with the policy expressed dogmatically, 
but with relatively limited evidence for the assertions made. Moreover, the issue is a hybrid 
of public policy, contractual rules and broader public law principles emanating from human 
rights law. It asks questions about the generality of principles such as the law’s disdain for 
fraudulent conduct, and the role of private law in deterring such conduct.1 
 
 
 
* Professor of Insurance & Commercial Law, University of Southampton. The authors would like to thank 
Dr Cliona Kelly and the anonymous referee(s) for constructive criticism on an earlier draft. The usual caveat 
applies.  
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1. In addition to the policy factors that shape contractual rules considered in detail in this paper, the effect of 
fraudulent exaggeration of a tort claim was considered in Summers v Fairclough Homes [2012] UKSC 26; [2013] 
Lloyd’s Rep IR 159; [2012] 1 WLR 2004. We note this below (text to fn.44) but, for reasons of space, do 
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The forfeiture rule deserves reconsideration, as is happening in the related doctrine of ex 
turpi causa non oritur actio, given the considerable academic,2 policymaker3 and 
judicial4 disquiet in both areas.  
The current forfeiture rule retains the simple ideological basis of the nineteenth-century 
law-making that spawned it.5 Adoption of a simple rule of thumb—such as “fraud unravels 
all”6—makes law prone to error. Lord Mance recognised the challenge that Daniel 
Kahneman’s work on behavioural heuristics poses to instinctive judicial decision-making:7 
 
“The brocard [ex turpi causa], as Lord Hunter called it, is of course an invitation to fast thinking of 
the type that the Nobel prize-winner Daniel Kahneman has in his book Thinking, Fast and Slow so 
tellingly—and, for decision-makers like myself, alarmingly—described. [The brocard] suggests 
easy answers, but is entirely fallacious in so doing. The most cursory examination of case-law in 
which ex turpi causa is discussed leaves uncertainty about what the policy underlying it is or when 
it is engaged.” 
 
We suggest that the forfeiture rule is problematic, with a similar uncertainty about the 
underlying policy and the ambit of the doctrine. 
 
Our approach 
 
This piece aims to make the design of effective insurance fraud deterrence the subject of 
considered analysis. This follows in the tradition of the great “dissents” in insurance law, 
such as Harnett & Thornton’s unpicking of insurable interest: “in order to prevent… 
deterioration into a set of fixed and unyielding ‘principles’, constant and vigilant re-
evaluation of concepts is necessary to enable legal concepts to keep pace with 
adjustments in external variables”.8 
 
not deal with this in detail. See W Norris QC, “Look out: I’ve got a power ... but I am not going to use it” 
(2012) JPI Law 169.  
2. The academic literature in both areas is voluminous, but a representative sample (excluding sources cited 
elsewhere in this paper) would include: B Soyer, Marine Insurance Fraud (Informa, London, 2014); J-A Tarr, 
“Fraudulent insurance claims: recent legal developments” [2008] JBL 139; G Swaby, “The Price of a Lie” 
[2013] JBL 77; J Hjalmarsson, “The law on fraudulent insurance claims” [2013] JBL 103 (insurance) and P 
Davies, “The illegality defence—two steps forward, one step back?” [2009] Conv PL 182; and H Stowe, “The 
‘Unruly Horse’ has Bolted: Tinsley v Milligan” (1994) 57 MLR 441 (illegality).  
3. Law Commission, Insurance Contract Law: Business Disclosure; Warranties; Insurers’ Remedies for 
Fraudulent Claims; and Late Payment (Law Com No 353, 2014) (insurance) and Law Commission, The 
Illegality Defence (LCCP 189, 2009); Law Commission, Illegal transactions: The effect of illegality on 
contract and trusts (LCCP 154, 1999) (illegality).  
4. See eg the comments in Versloot Dredging BV v HDI-Gerling Industrie Versicherung AG (The DC 
Merwestone) [2013] EWHC 1666 (Comm); [2013] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 311, [145–181] (per Popplewell J) 
(insurance) and Les Laboratoires Servier v Apotex [2014] UKSC 55; [2015] 1 AC 430, [14], [20] (per Lord 
Sumption) (illegality).  
5. Britton v Royal Insurance (1866) 4 F & F 905.  
6. Lazarus Estates Ltd v Beasley [1956] 1 QB 702, 712 (Denning LJ: “No court in this land will allow a 
person to keep an advantage which he has obtained by fraud. No judgment of a court, no order of a Minister, 
can be allowed to stand if it has been obtained by fraud. Fraud unravels everything. The court is careful not to 
find fraud unless it is distinctly pleaded and proved; but once it is proved, it vitiates judgments, contracts and 
all transactions whatsoever”).  
7. (Lord) J Mance, “Ex Turpi Causa—When Latin Avoids Liability” (2014) 18 Edin L Rev 175, 176.  
8. B Harnett and J Thornton, “Insurable Interest in Property: A Socio-Economic Re-evaluation of a Legal 
Concept” (1948) 48 Col L Rev 1162, 1162.  
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Our primary focus in this paper is the application of the forfeiture rule to fraudulent 
devices, not least because The DC Merwestone9 is shortly to be heard in the Supreme 
Court on this issue. However, much of our criticism would apply mutatis mutandis to the 
strict application of the forfeiture rule to other hard cases.  
The judicial development of the forfeiture rule was based, in part, on a sense of 
control. Christopher Clarke LJ in The DC Merwestone10 was not alone among the 
judiciary in referencing statistical evidence on the frequency and extent of fraudulent 
claims. Moreover, he reiterated the mantra that potential fraudsters must not think that 
there is no sanction for those who attempt, but fail, to defraud their insurers. We disagree 
with none of this. However, it massively overstates the effect of judicial pronouncements 
on the likely commission of fraudulent insurance claims. Other, more effective, 
mechanisms for deterrence are not routinely mentioned by the judiciary or in academic 
commentary. Common law judges overstate the influence of common law precedents 
and this is not surprising. However, in his excellent analysis of the role of law in society, 
David Howarth’s Law as Engineering11 reminds of the role of law beyond the courts: 
“judges are better seen as bricoleurs, patching up a structure designed, or at least built, 
by others, than as grand architects of public policy or as distant God-like defenders of 
abstract rights based on a timeless morality”. This image captures the true role of the 
fraud-deterring judge, who does not have jurisdiction over the true levers of control: the 
administration of civil and criminal justice; data-sharing within the insurance industry; 
insurance policy design; and claims-handling methods.12  
The first part of our critical analysis (Part IV) develops this approach. We show, by 
reference to the sophisticated deterrence literature in behavioural economics and criminology 
that the levers for control of fraudulent claims fall mostly outside insurance contract law. The 
forfeiture rule is of marginal significance in providing effective deterrence. The purpose of 
this Part is to show that the benefits of the current rule are overstated. In the subsequent Part 
(Part V), we demonstrate that the rule is inconsistent with other branches of contract law, and 
fails to account for the complex and diverse nature of fraudulent claims. Our paper, then, has 
two focal points: (a) the mature body of empirical and theoretical analysis showing that the 
forfeiture rule has a much more limited effect than that imagined by the judiciary; and (b) a 
detailed analysis of the contractual and non-contractual nature of the claims presentation 
process, informed by relational contract theory, to demonstrate the inconsistency at the heart 
of the current forfeiture rule. Specifically, we show that the insured is expected to behave 
cooperatively at the same time that the underwriter is permitted to behave in a selfish, 
market-individualist fashion. 
 
 
 
9. Versloot Dredging BV v HDI-Gerling Industrie Versicherung AG (The DC Merwestone) [2014] EWCA 
Civ 1349; [2015] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 32, expected to be heard in the Supreme Court on this issue in early 2016.  
10. [2014] EWCA Civ 1349; [2015] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 32, [114–116]. See also Galloway v Guardian Royal Exchange 
(UK) Ltd [1999] Lloyd’s Rep IR 209, 214, per Millett LJ; Manifest Shipping Co Ltd v Uni-Polaris Insurance Co Ltd 
(The Star Sea) [2001] UKHL 1; [2001] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 389; [2001] Lloyd’s Rep IR 247; [2003] 
1 AC 469, [62], per Lord Hobhouse of Woodborough. 
11. D Howarth, Law as Engineering (Edward Elgar, Cheltenham, 2013), 191.  
12. These institutional issues are the subject of the current Insurance Fraud Taskforce: www.gov.uk/ 
government/groups/insurance-fraud-taskforce.  
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Structure 
 
We begin, in Part II, by tracking the development of the forfeiture rule to date. In Part III we 
then set out the dispute in The DC Merwestone and identify the marine insurance issues that 
arose and the further challenge, on the basis of human rights law, that forfeiture was 
disproportionate. The remaining sections present our critical analysis described above:  
(a) we establish the limited role that the forfeiture rule plays in the real world deterrence 
of fraud (Part IV); and (b) we then put the forfeiture rule in its broader civil law context, 
by contrasting the effects of falsification on claims in insurance and employment law in 
light of the cooperation expected of both parties outside of contractual duties (Part V). 
 
 
II. THE NATURAL HISTORY OF THE FORFEITURE RULE 
 
The forfeiture rule is traced to the decision of Willes J in Britton v Royal Insurance,13 
where, in relation to a claim for a loss allegedly caused by arson, he held that the assured 
could not recover. The result was not dependent on the inclusion of an express term 
within the policy14 but was, rather, “in accordance with justice, and also with sound 
policy. The law is, that a person who has made such a fraudulent claim could not be 
permitted to recover at all.”15 Wholly fabricated or exaggerated claims would thus be 
forfeit unless the level of exaggeration could be construed as a starting point for 
commercial negotiation.16 Later case law further clarified that the entire claim to which 
the fraud relates is barred, meaning that the insurer can recover interim payments but 
remains liable for genuine claims which pre-date the fraud.17 
 
The juridical basis of the forfeiture rule 
 
There is no universally agreed basis for the forfeiture rule.18 The analysis offered by 
Christopher Clarke LJ in the Court of Appeal in The DC Merwestone suggests that it is based, 
at least in part, on the relationship of utmost good faith between insured and underwriter.19 
The precise basis is not central to our analysis, but we note that this would place the rule as a 
positive rule of law, rather than as an implied term. As for its derivation from the doctrine of 
utmost good faith, this is plausible, but causes some difficulties. If we adopt the analysis 
offered by Malcolm Clarke, then the concept of good faith revives throughout the life of the 
contract at a level appropriate to the particular phase of the 
 
 
13. (1866) 4 F & F 905. 
14. See eg Loseby v Price, The London Express, 20 August 1866; Levy v Baillie (1831) 7 Bing 349. 
15. Britton (1866) 4 F & F 905, 909, per Willes J.  
16. Nsubuga v Commercial Union Assurance [1998] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 682, 686; Orakpo v Barclays Insurance 
Services [1995] LRLR 443, 451. See further J Davey, “Unpicking the fraudulent claims jurisdiction in 
insurance contract law: sympathy for the devil?” [2006] LMCLQ 223, 226.  
17. Axa General Insurance Ltd v Gottlieb [2005] EWCA Civ 112; [2005] 1 Lloyd’s Rep IR 369, [31–32], 
per Mance LJ.  
18. The juridical basis for the doctrine has come under scrutiny in the Court of Appeal when considering 
the relevant test for materiality. See below, in the discussion of materiality in Part IV. 
19. The DC Merwestone [2014] EWCA Civ 1349; [2015] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 32, [75–77].  
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relationship.20 Case law has suggested that the claims stage is one in which the assured 
should observe good faith, and this was characterised in The Star Sea21 as a duty of 
honesty. The difficulty with this approach is that the Marine Insurance Act 1906, s.17 
provides the remedy of avoidance ab initio for breaches of the doctrine of utmost good 
faith. It is, we understand, for this reason that Mance LJ (as he then was) sought to 
explain the forfeiture rule as operating independently of utmost good faith.22 Either way, 
it is agreed that this duty operates only until the commencement of litigation.23 
 
The policy justification(s) for the forfeiture rule 
 
We have found three possible justifications for the doctrine. The basis for the forfeiture 
rule has been commonly expressed by the courts as a broadly moral purpose consistent 
with judicial refusal to engage with those who commit fraud. This is further strengthened 
by an instrumental purpose: the deterrence of would-be fraudsters. These are familiar to 
insurance lawyers.  
Academic commentators have also suggested that pre-contractual fraud might 
represent a further instrumental purpose: the reduction of wasted transaction costs.24 
Where the defendant knows that he has no honest belief in his statement, the claimant’s 
costs incurred in investigating and establishing the lie are socially unproductive and 
wasted. This has been extended from pre-contractual misrepresentation to post-
contractual insurance claims processes without full consideration. Clift has usefully 
identified that the historic development of the forfeiture rule reflected the needs of 
underwriters to rely on documents and representations made by their assureds, given the 
(then) primitive nature of investigative techniques.25 This may have been true when the 
rule was developed; but it is less plausible today. The “baffling array of technical 
wizardry”26 available to a modern underwriter no longer requires him to rely wholly on 
the word of his assured and he may be equally well placed to investigate the validity of a 
claim himself, provided he has equal access to witnesses, technical reports and the like. 
 
The ambit of the forfeiture rule 
 
Historically there was little consideration of the type of “fraud” we see in The DC 
Merwestone—the genuine claim supplemented by fraudulent evidence, be that a forged 
receipt or a misleading account of events. These are commonly referred to as claims subject 
to “fraudulent devices” (or “device claims”). The issue was first considered in The 
 
20. M Clarke, Law of Insurance Contracts, 4th edn (Informa, London, 2014), [27.1A1], [27.1A2].  
21. Manifest Shipping Co Ltd v Uni-Polaris Insurance Co Ltd (The Star Sea) [2001] UKHL 1; [2001] 1 
Lloyd’s Rep 389; [2001] Lloyd’s Rep IR 247 ; [2003] 1 AC 469, [111], per Lord Scott of Foscote.  
22. Agapitos v Agnew (The Aegeon) [2002] EWCA Civ 247, [2002] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 42; [2002] Lloyd’s Rep 
IR 573; [2003] QB 556, [21]. 
23. Ibid, [52].  
24. D Harris, D Campbell and R Halson, Remedies in Contract and Tort, 2nd edn (Butterworths Tolley, 
Croydon, 2001), 554–557.  
25. R Clift, “Fraud: Does the punishment fit the crime?”, International Marine Claims Conference (24 
October 2007). 
26. Ibid, 12.  
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Litsion Pride,27 where a fraudulently backdated letter was held to constitute a material 
fraud. The decision has since been questioned, because it took the view that the 
forfeiture rule was derived from the doctrine of utmost good faith.28  
Despite wide-ranging definitions of fraud which extended to a misleading account of 
the cause of the loss29 and an attempt by the assured to gain (quicker) payment through 
deceit,30 there was no authority establishing how the type of claim we see in The DC 
Merwestone would be resolved judicially. Mance LJ advanced the position in The 
Aegeon,31 whilst noting the absence of prior authority. His detailed judgment evidences a 
policy analysis of the forfeiture rule, “which time has done nothing to alter”.32 His 
tentative conclusion was that forfeiture should apply to device claims where it is directly 
related to the claim and, “if believed, [would] tend, objectively, prior to any final 
determination at trial of the parties’ rights, to yield a not insignificant improvement in 
the insured’s prospects”.33 Despite some early reservations,34 post-Aegeon courts have 
generally applied Mance LJ’s extended version.35  
The Insurance Act 2015 has codified and clarified the remedy that applies to fraudulent 
claims, but did not seek to define the limits of the doctrine. The questions that arose in The 
DC Merwestone related to the application of forfeiture to fraudulent devices, and to limits on 
its use (such as materiality), and these remain a matter for the courts. 
 
 
III. THE DISPUTE IN THE DC MERWESTONE 
 
The factual situation that gave rise to the dispute in The DC Merwestone is unremarkable. A 
vessel, carrying a cargo of scrap iron, left Klaipeda in Lithuania for a voyage to Bilbao. 
During its time in port, the crew had used the high-pressure hose on deck but (negligently) 
failed to close the sea suction valve after use. Water remained in the system even after it was 
operational. Due to the cold weather conditions in Lithuania, the water expanded as it froze in 
the system, causing a leak into the forward bowthruster room. This leak led to entry of 
seawater into the vessel, but ought not to have caused any immediate loss of control. 
However, the bulkheads between the bowthruster room and the rest of the vessel had not 
been sealed properly, with the consequence that seawater was able to enter the 
 
27. Black King Shipping Corp v Massie (The Litsion Pride) [1985] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 437, 519.  
28. The Star Sea [2001] UKHL 1; [2001] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 389; [2001] Lloyd’s Rep IR 247; [2003] 1 AC 469, 
[71], per Lord Hobhouse: “the actual claim made was a valid claim for a loss which had occurred and had been 
caused by a peril insured against when the vessel was covered by a held covered clause.”  
29. Reid & Co v Employers Accident & Livestock [1899] l SC 1031, 1036–1037: “fraudulent 
misrepresentation or misdescription of the circumstances under which the claim has arisen, or the nature and 
extent of the damage done, for which the claim for indemnity was made.”  
30. See Wisenthal v World Auxiliary Insurance Corp (1930) 38 Ll Rep 54, 62. This is referred to in The DC 
Merwestone [2014] EWCA Civ 1349; [2015] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 32, [123].  
31. Agapitos v Agnew (The Aegeon) [2002] EWCA Civ 247; [2002] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 42; [2002] Lloyd’s Rep 
IR 573; [2003] QB 556, [45]. 
32. Ibid, [45]. 
33. Ibid, [45].  
34. Interpart Comerciao e Gestao SA v Lexington Insurance Co [2004] EWHC (Comm); [2004] Lloyd’s 
Rep IR 690, [43].  
35. Stemson v AMP General Insurance (NZ) Ltd [2006] UKPC 30; [2006] 1 Lloyd’s Rep IR 852, [36]; 
Aviva Insurance v Brown [2011] EWHC 362 (QB); [2012] 1 Lloyd’s Rep IR 211, [77].  
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engine room. The vessel left port on 27 January 2010 and water was detected in the 
engine room the next day. Within three hours of the leak’s first being detected, the 
engine room had flooded and the engine was inoperative, despite attempts by the crew to 
discover the source of the leak and to pump out the engine room. A subsequent 
investigation showed that the pumps in that area of the vessel were not working 
efficiently. The vessel was towed to a nearby port and repaired at a total cost of around 
€3.2 million. The vessel was insured with the respondents on the basis of the Institute 
Time Clauses Hulls (1/10/83) and the Institute Additional Perils Clause Hulls, and the 
vessel’s owners submitted a claim for indemnification.  
These were the initial facts as discovered by Popplewell J at first instance,36 and were 
generally not contested on appeal (although some further findings were disputed). This 
can be summarised in simple terms: we have a genuine loss, which is prima facie within 
the terms of the insurance policy.37 However, the precise cause of the loss and the order 
of events were not obvious at the time of the loss, and this was problematic for the 
insured owner. Under insurance law, it is for the insured to prove at trial that the 
proximate cause of the loss is within the terms of the policy. It is not enough to show 
that a loss has occurred; it must be shown to be a loss caused by a peril insured against. 
Thus, in seeking indemnification for a loss by perils of the sea, the insured will have to 
adduce evidence as to the fortuitous nature of the loss. This may require some precision 
in identifying the chain of events that led to the loss.38  
This additional requirement of proving the loss is perhaps not fully comprehended by 
insureds.39 Indeed, any attempt entirely to rationalise the precise relationship between 
the occurrence of an insured event and the underwriter’s obligation to pay the claim is 
problematic even for those totally familiar with insurance contract law.40 It should be 
noted—as it is significant for the analysis to follow—that the insured did not, under the 
contract of insurance between these parties, owe any contractual duty to establish his 
claim to the underwriter. This is a pre-condition to success at trial, not the effective 
submission of claim. So, for example, the International Hulls Clauses 2003 contain a 
claims cooperation clause, but the Institute Time Clauses Hulls used here does not.  
At first instance, the underwriter denied liability on a number of grounds: that the 
proximate cause of the loss was not perils of the sea; that it was in any case irrecoverable 
on the basis of unseaworthiness under the Marine Insurance Act 1906, s.39(5); and that 
the claim was barred because of the use of a “fraudulent device” to support the claim. 
 
36. [2013] EWHC 1666 (Comm); [2013] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 311.  
37. Christopher Clarke LJ in the Court of Appeal adopted the findings of fact of Popplewell J that this was 
a loss by perils of the sea occasioned by crew negligence.  
38. J Gilman QC et al, Arnould: Law of Marine Insurance & Average, 18th edn (Sweet & Maxwell, 
London, 2013), [22.01].  
39. T Baker, “Constructing the Insurance Relationship: Sales Stories, Claims Stories, and Insurance 
Contract Damages” (1994) 72 Tex L Rev 1395, 1408–1410 stresses the need for intermediaries to educate the 
insured post loss in the limits of the coverage within the contract.  
40. In non-liability insurance, the insurer is commonly assumed to have (impliedly) promised to “hold 
harmless” the insured, ie to prevent any loss from occurring. This means that liability arises at the moment of 
the loss, and is technically a claim for damages for breach of contract. This artificial analysis has a number of 
undesirable consequences; see further J Davey, “Once more unto the breach: remedies for the non-payment of 
insurance claims after Blake”, in P Giliker (ed.), Re-Examining Contract and Unjust Enrichment (Brill, 
Leiden, 2007).  
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On appeal, two issues were contested in detail: the application of the forfeiture rule to 
fraudulent devices; and the compatibility of that common law rule with the Human 
Rights Act 1998. 
 
The fraudulent device defence 
 
The underwriter failed to persuade the first instance court of any defence other than the 
fraudulent device point, and that defence was upheld only with “manifest reluctance”41 
by Popplewell J, and after considerable discussion of the arguments that could be made 
against such a ruling.  
The finding of fraud depended on an assertion made by Chris Kornet, one of the 
managers of the vessel, that the bilge alarm on the vessel had sounded at around noon on 
the day of the loss and been ignored by the crew as routine. This assertion was made on 
21 April 2010 as part of the evidence submitted to support the claim. It gave the false 
impression that Kornet had spoken to the master and received confirmation on this point. 
He had not. The account was plausible: the bilge alarm on the vessel did not distinguish 
between the forward and aft sections of the vessel, and the forward bowthruster alarm 
was known to give false positives when the vessel was rolling due to heavy weather. 
This assertion was therefore found to be speculative, although the master of the vessel 
was later prepared to support that description of events.42 Ultimately, this is a statement 
in support of the claim, made recklessly, and thereby fraudulently.  
The question for the Court of Appeal was whether to confirm the obiter comments 
made by Mance LJ (as he then was) in The Aegeon on the broad applicability of the 
forfeiture rule to such frauds, or to introduce some further limiting factor. Christopher 
Clarke LJ found a number of “powerful reasons” to apply The Aegeon.43 The bulk of 
these relied on the authoritative nature of the earlier judgment and its subsequent 
adoption by later courts, including the Privy Council.  
Having failed to persuade the Court of Appeal that their actions fell short of an 
actionable fraudulent device, the insured argued in the alternative that the forfeiture rule 
was contrary to the Human Rights Act 1998 as a disproportionate deprivation of 
property, and should be revised accordingly. 
 
Forfeiture as a deprivation of property rights (and the “Human Rights” perspective) 
 
Viewing forfeiture as depriving the assured of valuable property rights enabled counsel for 
the owners to strengthen their case for indemnification with the aid of the Human Rights Act 
1998. This was a novel argument, which followed the acceptance of similar arguments 
 
 
 
 
41. As described at [2014] EWCA Civ 1349; [2015] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 32, [2], per Christopher Clarke LJ.  
42. The reported facts of the case are a construct of the process of litigation and rarely indicate the actual 
course of events. We suspect that the narrative here is heavily shaped by the current position of the law.  
43. The DC Merwestone [2014] EWCA Civ 1349; [2015] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 32, [106]. The six reasons 
underlying the decision are explained at length at [107–134].  
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by the Supreme Court in a case of personal injury fraud44 and Popplewell J’s comments 
at first instance.45 
The Human Rights Act 1998 incorporates into English law the European Convention on  
Human Rights (1950), of which Article 1, Protocol 1 (“A1P1”) provides: 
 
“Every natural or legal person is entitled to the peaceful enjoyment of his possessions. No one 
shall be deprived of his possessions except in the public interest and subject to the conditions 
provided for by law and by the general principles of international law.” 
 
The right to an insurance indemnity arises on the occurrence of the loss.46 An 
insurance claim, following the Supreme Court decision that contractual rights constitute 
“possessions”,47 has been duly characterised as falling within the scope of A1P1.48 The 
forfeiture of an insurance claim is thus a potential infringement of these rights, unless it 
is in the public interest and achieved in a proportionate manner.  
It was common ground that the deterrence of fraud fell within the public interest.49 “The 
more difficult question”50 for the court was whether the application of the forfeiture rule to 
device claims met the second requirement of A1P1, namely that it achieved that deterrence 
proportionately. The court held that it did. “Bright line rules” to counter fraud would be 
proportionate even where this resulted in very harsh consequences for the assured.51  
We suggest that Christopher Clarke LJ’s approach to the proportionality question in 
The DC Merwestone was not consistent with recent domestic litigation in this area. The 
approach adopted in the Court of Appeal was to consider whether the forfeiture rule was 
a proportionate means of deterring insurance claims fraud.52 This approach rested on the 
case of James v UK,53 heard by the European Court of Human Rights in the mid-1980s. 
Where the essence of the complaint contests a piece of legislation, the court held that 
attention should be focused primarily on the proportionality of the legislation as a whole 
and account then taken of the individual circumstances.54 Christopher Clarke LJ in The 
 
 
44. In Summers v Fairclough Homes [2012] UKSC 26; [2013] Lloyd’s Rep IR 159; [2012] 1 WLR 2004, 
the claimant, who was injured at work, submitted a claim of nearly £900,000. This was substantially 
fraudulent: his injuries were assessed in the region of £88,000. The court recognised that it had the power to 
strike out claims such as these. As judgment on liability was a possession within A1P1 (see the following 
paragraph in the text), strike-out would deprive him of that possession and consequently would be appropriate 
only where it was just and proportionate in light of the circumstances: at [46–47]. Courts were to make use of 
other procedural techniques to deter fraud: at [50–62]. The position has now changed, following the enactment 
of the Criminal Justice and Courts Act 2015, s.57; see post, text to fn.64 and fn.119. 
45. The DC Merwestone [2013] EWHC 1666 (Comm); [2013] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 311, [171–172], [177].  
46. Firma C-Trade SA v Newcastle Protection and Indemnity Assn (The Fanti and The Padre Island) (No 2)  
[1991] 2 AC 1, 35, per Lord Goff of Chieveley: “I accept that, at common law, a contract of indemnity gives 
rise to an action for unliquidated damages, arising from the failure of the indemnifier to prevent the 
indemnified person from suffering damage, for example, by having to pay a third party”, known as the “hold 
harmless” doctrine (see supra, fn.40).  
47. Wilson v First County Trust Ltd (No 2) [2003] UKHL 40; [2004] AC 816, [39]. 
48. The DC Merwestone [2014] EWCA Civ 1349; [2015] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 32, [141]. 
49. Ibid, [145] 
50. Ibid, [146] 
51. Ibid, [154–155]. 
52. Ibid, [143]. 
53. (1986) 8 EHRR 123. 
54. Ibid, [36].  
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DC Merwestone55 considered that this was the correct approach when a “common law 
principle of general application” is contested.  
Instead, the Supreme Court has, more recently, preferred to focus on whether the 
contested measure is proportionate in the individual case and has called for “careful 
consideration of the particular facts”.56 There has been detailed consideration of the 
claimant’s position even where the compatibility of legislation is at issue.57 The 
Supreme Court in both Axa General and Barnes made reference to the much earlier 
decision in James, but focused on a different part of the judgment, requiring that:58 
 
“[a] ‘fair balance’… must be struck between the demands of the general interest of the community and 
the requirements of the protection of the individual’s fundamental rights… The requisite balance will 
not be found if the person concerned has had to bear ‘an individual and excessive burden’.” 
 
Christopher Clarke LJ appeared to recognise these approaches as distinct59 but failed to 
consider the consequences of forfeiture for the assureds in the context of proportionality. As 
such, we suggest that the correct approach remains a live issue for the Supreme Court and 
justifies the appeal on this basis alone. The implicit reasoning of Popplewell J and the 
owners’ argument in the Court of Appeal, a case-by-case approach, is preferable.60  
The Court of Appeal also expressed concern that use of the Human Rights Act 1998 in this 
way would dramatically increase insurance litigation.61 This is unconvincing, not least 
because an allegation of fraud is rarely the only defence an underwriter will put at trial. The 
Australian Insurance Contracts Act 1984 provides a useful comparison here. Forfeiture 
remains the primary sanction for fraudulent insureds but the statute establishes a judicial 
discretion to order such payment as is just and equitable “if only a minimal or insignificant 
part of the claim is made fraudulently”.62 We have found no evidence to suggest that the 
floodgates fear has materialised in practice. Moreover, it is suggested that the discretion is in 
practice currently working well, with Michael Kirby remarking that:63 
 
“most Australian lawyers, expert in this field, would not now want to go back to the old absolute 
law. And the Australian insurance industry appears to be of the same view, taking into account the 
actual operation of the proportionate operation of the ICA in practice.” 
 
This floodgates argument is even less persuasive following recent UK legislation. The 
Criminal Justice and Courts Act 2015 requires courts to dismiss the claim of a 
 
55. The DC Merwestone [2014] EWCA Civ 1349; [2015] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 32, [143].  
56. Axa General Insurance Ltd v The Lord Advocate [2011] UKSC 46; [2012] 1 AC 868, [128]; Barnes v 
The Eastenders Group [2014] UKSC 26; [2014] Lloyd’s Rep FC 461; [2015] AC 1, [94].  
57. Axa General Insurance v The Lord Advocate [2011] UKSC 46; [2012] 1 AC 868, [36–41], per Lord 
Reed. This case concerned whether an Act of the Scottish Parliament, which determined that certain forms of 
asbestos-related harm would now be actionable, constituted an unlawful infringement of the A1P1 rights of the 
insurance companies.  
58. James v UK (1986) 8 EHRR 123, [50]. 
59. The DC Merwestone [2014] EWCA Civ 1349; [2015] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 32, [143]  
60. See The DC Merwestone [2013] EWHC 1666 (Comm); [2013] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 311, [181], [225]; [2014] 
EWCA Civ 1349; [2015] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 32, [136] 
61. Ibid, [157] 
62. Insurance Contracts Act 1984 (Australia), s.56(2)–(3).  
63. The Hon M Kirby, “Insurance contract law reform—30 years on” (2014) 26 ILJ 1, 17. See also R 
Merkin, Reforming Insurance Law: Is there a case for reverse transportation (Law Commissions, 2007), 
[6.11]. For a contrary view, see Law Reform Commission, Insurance Contracts (LRC CP 65, 2011), [8.24].  
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“fundamentally dishonest” personal injury litigant unless substantial injustice would 
result.64 This discretion, specifically built into the Act, has not elicited the same concern 
as expressed in The DC Merwestone. In the Supreme Court case which this statute 
amends, fraud deterrence was a relevant concern65 and the architects of this statutory 
discretion presumably did not think this would weaken any deterrent value of the law. 
 
Dissent 
 
The assured’s account of the loss in The DC Merwestone was his best guess at what had 
happened and was (apparently) corroborated by the ship’s master shortly thereafter. We 
accept that its location in a section marked “facts” was fraudulent but we share the 
“manifest reluctance” of Popplewell J at the application of the forfeiture rule to these 
facts. We now offer a series of arguments against the current formulation. 
 
 
IV. A SCEPTICAL REVIEW OF “DETERRENCE” 
 
This adherence to a single civil sanction for insurance fraud indicates law’s clear preference 
for deterrence at the expense of more proportionate remedies.66 This has not been justified by 
notions of consent (“this is what the parties agreed”) but by reference to positive law rules 
seeking to deter dishonesty. The application of the forfeiture rule to both fabricated and 
device claims assumes that the same policy concerns arise, though this is questionable, given 
the existence of wholly genuine loss in the latter scenario. Deterrence has been emphasised in 
judgments since the 1860s; and a recent authoritative account is found in comments made by 
Lord Hobhouse of Woodborough in The Star Sea:67 
 
“[The law] will not allow an insured who has made a fraudulent claim to recover. The logic is 
simple. The fraudulent insured must not be allowed to think: if the fraud is successful, then I will 
gain; if it is unsuccessful, I will lose nothing.” 
 
We do not suggest that the deterrence of fraud is not a role for the civil law but we are 
generally sceptical of it as an overreaching policy goal, and for a variety of reasons 
which we develop below: 
 
(a) it ignores real world costs imposed on a fraudulent insured;  
(b) it has the greatest impact on those who are least fraudulent (and vice versa);  
(c) it fails to take account of the substantial literature on the effective deterrence of 
fraudulent conduct; 
 
 
64. Section 57. These concepts are not defined in the Act.  
65. Summers v Fairclough Homes [2012] UKSC 26; [2013] Lloyd’s Rep IR 159; [2012] 1 WLR 2004, [51].  
66. In contrast, the Insurance Act 2015 creates a default regime of proportionate remedies. Where the assured  
does not present the risk fairly, as required by s.3, the underwriter’s remedies in s.8 and Sch.1 are limited by 
what they would have done had a fair presentation been made. Section 10 provides that breach of warranty will 
no longer terminate the underwriter’s liability automatically but that liability is suspended on breach and will 
reattach where breach is remedied prior to the loss. 
67. [2001] UKHL 1; [2001] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 389; [2001] Lloyd’s Rep IR 247; [2003] 1 AC 469, [62].  
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(d) it lacks an effective threshold element (such as “materiality”);  
(e) the imposition of a draconian duty on the insured is not matched by a similar duty on 
the underwriter; and  
(f) the draconian approach to insurance fraud in the civil courts is not mirrored in other 
contexts. 
 
The real costs to the insured of proven fraud 
 
Judges have frequently asserted that the absence of a draconian remedy for submitting a 
fraudulent claim (or, as extended, supporting a genuine claim with dishonest statements) 
would leave the fraudster in a “no lose” situation. This is a straw man. The real sanctions 
for breaking market norms come (as so often) not from formal legal rules, but from loss 
of reputation and social stigmatisation.68  
First, there is the role of criminal justice: the possibility of criminal sanction for 
committing an insurance fraud increased significantly following changes to the specialist 
investigatory resources available to the police force.69 Much has changed in the 
prosecution of insurance fraud since 2008, when, in frustration at the limited sanctions 
imposed by the criminal justice system, AXA Insurance sought exemplary damages 
against two defendants who had committed insurance fraud against them.70 Funded by 
the insurance industry, the Insurance Fraud Enforcement Department has established a 
strong media presence with contributions to the BBC television series Claimed and 
Shamed and has investigated more than 1,000 suspected insurance frauds since 2012.71 
The BBC website for the series provides links to the City of London Police’s Insurance 
Fraud Enforcement Department (“IFED”), the industry’s fraud prevention bureau, and 
related bodies.72 Moreover, IFED has expertise in recovering the proceeds of crime; it 
has secured nearly £190,000 worth of assets under the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002 and 
has restrained a further £800,000 worth.73 This visible presence as a “fraud buster” is 
likely to be significant. Criminology suggests that an increase in the perceived risk of 
detection is a greater deterrent than the potential sanction.74  
Secondly, there is a considerable social stigma that attaches to being convicted of 
insurance fraud.75 The commission of fraud resembles one of the Yes, Minister famous 
 
68. J Karpoff and J Lott Jr, “The Reputational Penalty Firms Bear From Committing Criminal Fraud” 
(1993) 36 J L & Econ 757.  
69. City of London Police, “IFED” www.cityoflondon.police.uk/advice-and-support/fraud-and-economic-
crime/ifed/Pages/default.aspx. We recognise that the declared focus of law enforcement is on claims that are 
wholly or partly dishonest, rather than the use of fraudulent evidence in support of an honest claim.  
70. AXA Insurance UK Ltd v Jensen (10 November 2008) LawTel, [10] (cautioned, exemplary damages 
awarded); AXA Insurance UK Ltd v Thwaites (8 February 2008) LawTel, [13–14] (suspended sentence, 
exemplary damages refused).  
71. Leading to 98 convictions and 542 months of imprisonment: DCI D Wood, IFED: The Next Chapter, 
ABI Fraud Conference (17 September 2014). 
72. BBC, Claimed and Shamed www.bbc.co.uk/programmes/b01nhs7s. 
73. See supra, fn.71. 
74. Discussed in detail below: see post, text to fn.82.  
75. Economists have collated considerable evidence on the effect of conviction for serious offences on life 
chances: eg J Waldfogel, “The Effect of Criminal Conviction on Income and the Trust ‘Reposed in the 
Workmen’” (1994) 29 J of Hum Res 62.  
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irregular verbs: “I get what I deserve after years of paying premiums without a claim. 
You exaggerate your claim. He is a fraudster.”76 Whilst empirical evidence suggests that 
insurance is often viewed as a victimless crime,77 this does not mean that a conviction 
will have only limited impact on the community or employment status of the insured.  
Finally, and this applies to commercial and consumer insureds, there is a substantial effect 
on the market position of the insured. In addition to industry investment in IFED, the 
Insurance Fraud Bureau (“IFB”) operates a database of fraudulent insurance behaviour: the 
Insurance Fraud Register.78 Moreover, the IFB encourages “whistleblowing” by the general 
public to its Cheatline, in a manner similar to the governmental measures on benefits fraud.79 
Additionally, the Government has proposed sharing fraud-related data across a broad range of 
public and private sectors, which would alert insurers to prior dishonest behaviour even 
beyond insurance claims, enabling them to decline proposals (and scrutinise claims) from 
those with a record of such behaviour.80  
The civil law forfeiture rule, is then, of marginal significance in the deterrence of 
fraud. Few are likely to be aware of the rule, and its “draconian” effect is dwarfed by the 
other potential sanctions imposed by the justice system and market. 
 
The inverse relationship between culpability and deterrent 
 
Our next critique of the forfeiture rule considers the inverse relationship it creates 
between the level of dishonesty involved and the likelihood of a deterrent effect. This 
does not seem to have been realised by the designers of the rule. The more dishonest the 
scheme, the less the forfeiture rule impacts on the rights of the fraudulent claimant.  
Take at one end of the spectrum the type of organised criminality that has targeted 
motor insurers in recent decades: the “crash for cash”. Here there is no genuine loss, as it 
is deliberately orchestrated by the insured and would fall either outside the terms of the 
policy, or within contractual exceptions to cover. Forfeiting the remote possibility of an 
enforceable claim against the insurer is no real deterrent. The assumption made by many 
fraudsters is that the dishonesty will not be detected or will at least go unproven.81 As 
considered above, the industry has recognised this and responded with investments in the 
criminal justice and administrative support for the detection and prosecution of fraud in 
insurance. Switch now to the least culpable end: the fraudulent device. Here there is a 
genuine claim, but the insured has deliberately or recklessly provided false evidence to 
promote the claim. The insured may not actually gain any real advantage: the claim 
 
76. Written by Antony Jay and Jonathan Lynn, the TV series Yes, Minister and Yes, Prime Minster 
contained beautifully scripted dialogue such as this line from civil servant Bernard Wooley: “That’s one of 
those irregular verbs, isn’t it? I give confidential security briefings. You leak. He has been charged under 
section 2a of the Official Secrets Act.” See: m.imdb.com/title/tt0080306/quotes?qt=qt0242452.  
77. S Tennyson, “Economic institutions and individual ethics: A study of consumer attitudes toward 
insurance fraud” (1997) 32 J of Econ Behav & Org 247. 
78. R Davies, Using the IFR as a front-end screening tool, ABI Fraud Conference (17 September 2014).  
79. B Fletcher, Harnessing Industry intelligence to combat fraud: The IFB Strategy, ABI Fraud Conference 
(17 September 2014). 
80. L Hume, Counter Fraud Checking Service, ABI Fraud Conference (17 September 2014).  
81. K Richards, “Deterring insurance fraud: A critical and criminological analysis of the English and 
Scottish Law Commissions’ current proposals for reform” (2013) 24 Ins LJ 16; and J Davey, “Dial M for 
moral hazard? Incentives to murder and the Life Assurance Act 1774” (2014) 25 Ins LJ 120.  
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might have been payable even without the lie. The insured may be reacting to perceived 
resistance from the underwriter to pay, and merely seeking to expedite what it views as 
its entitlement. Here, the possible impact on the insured is considerable, even though its 
level of culpability is lower. 
 
No account taken of the deterrence literature 
 
As we have demonstrated, the forfeiture rule operates haphazardly. On the one hand, it 
imposes no formal sanction on the fraudster who totally invents his claim and yet visits 
very harsh consequences on the assured who bolsters his claim with misleading 
evidence. This overlooks decades of social science literature on deterrence.82 
Considerations of deterrence first emerged in the eighteenth century in response to the 
capricious legal systems of the day.83 Classic theory suggested that the higher the costs 
associated with punishment, the less likely an offence would be committed. The costs in 
this equation were the certainty of detection and the severity of punishment.84 On this 
understanding, deterrence theory relied upon setting the punishment at a level which just 
exceeded the benefits of offending.  
Modern deterrence theory built on these early ideas and suggested that the certainty of 
detection was a far stronger indicator of deterrence than harsh sanctions and has been 
substantiated by a number of empirical methods.85 The literature also indicated that social 
stigma and shame were more powerful deterrents to illegal behaviour than formal legal 
sanctions.86 The media presence of IFED, discussed above, is perhaps an attempt by the 
industry to capitalise on these extra-legal deterrents. As the majority of would-be offenders 
have little knowledge of the actual likelihood of being caught and punished,87 it is their 
perception of the costs of offending which are more relevant. Policymakers and the industry 
therefore need to focus on changing perceptions in addition to changing the legal framework. 
Modern hybrid models have sought to harness the deterrent effect of formal and informal 
sanctions to offer a more accurate measure of compliance with the law than earlier studies, 
which focused on legal sanctions alone.88 The emerging field of behavioural science provides 
useful insights in this context, not least in demonstrating that the decision-making process is 
hampered by cognitive biases and the use of heuristics, 
 
 
82. We have considered the deterrent effect of the forfeiture rule elsewhere: see Richards (2013) 24 Ins LJ  
16. There is a considerable body of work in this area. A representative sample, excluding sources cited in this 
article, includes: M Tonry, “Learning from the limitations of deterrence research”, in M Tonry (ed.), Crime 
and Justice: A Review of Research, Vol. 37 (University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 2008); K Varma and A 
Doob, “Deterring economic crimes: The case of tax evasion” (1998) 40 Canadian J Criminology 165; and E 
Blais and JL Bacher, “Situational deterrence and claim padding: Results from a randomized field experiment” 
(2007) 3 J Exp Criminol 337.  
83. R Akers, Criminological Theories Introduction, Evaluation and Application, 3rd edn (Roxbury 
Publishing, Los Angeles, 2000), 15. 
84. Ibid, 17.  
85. S Klepper and D Nagin, “The deterrent effect of perceived certainty and severity of punishment revisited”  
(1989) 27 Criminology 721, 741. 
86. Ibid, 721. 
87. Akers, 19.  
88. D Nagin and G Pogarsky, “Integrating celerity, impulsivity, and extralegal sanction threats into a model 
of general deterrence: Theory and evidence” (2001) 39 Criminology 865, 866.  
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and is strongly affected by personal experience.89 It is important to take account of these 
lessons in creating policy to ensure that deterrence is not an illusory aim.90 Trials carried 
out by the Behavioural Insights Team91 focusing on the reduction of fraud, error and 
debt to public bodies have highlighted the practical application of these lessons and 
demonstrate recognition of the utility of behavioural science by Government.92  
There are two conclusions to be drawn here. First, the judicial emphasis placed on the 
draconian nature of the forfeiture rule as vital to deterrence is undermined by this body 
of work and deserves reconsideration in this broader context. Additionally, it is clear that 
one sanction cannot counter a spectrum of fraudulent behaviours, given that the 
anticipated benefits to the fraudster will vary considerably. A more proportionate 
framework, whatever this might look like in practice, would meet these concerns. 
 
Lack of an effective materiality threshold 
 
In extending the forfeiture rule to include fraudulent devices in The Aegeon, the Court of 
Appeal recognised the need to develop a materiality requirement applicable in these 
circumstances. Mance LJ’s ‘tentative obiter’ formulation provided that forfeiture would 
operate in respect of : 
 
“any lie, directly related to the claim to which the fraudulent device relates, which is intended to 
improve the insured’s prospects of obtaining a settlement or winning the case, and which would, if 
believed, tend, objectively, prior to any final determination at trial of the parties’ rights, to yield a 
not insignificant improvement in the insured’s prospects—whether they be prospects of obtaining 
a settlement, or a better settlement, or of winning at trial”.93 
 
Courts were initially reluctant to apply the extended version of the rule due to a lack of 
clarity regarding the link between the device and the claim.94 The rule has since received 
recognition from the Privy Council,95 although it is noteworthy that the Court of Appeal in 
The DC Merwestone was the first to apply it as a matter of ratio.96 Despite this, the precise 
meanings of “directly related” and “not insignificant improvement” remain unsettled. 
 
 
89. D Kahneman, Thinking, Fast and Slow (Penguin, London, 2011), 129; C Jolls, C Sunstein and R Thaler, 
“A behavioral approach to law and economics”, in C Sunstein (ed.), Behavioral Law and Economics 
(Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2000), 45; P Feldman, The Psychology of Crime (Cambridge 
University Press, Cambridge, 1993), 265.  
90. There is some evidence that policymakers and the industry are taking account of behavioural science. 
The Financial Conduct Authority indicated that behavioural science would play a major role in shaping 
regulation: FCA, Applying behavioural economics at the Financial Conduct Authority (2013), 
www.fca.org.uk/your-fca/ documents/occasional-papers/occasional-paper-1.  
91. A social purpose company owned by its employees, the UK Government and Nesta (UK innovation 
charity) dedicated to the application of behavioural science. See www.behaviouralinsights.co.uk/about-us.  
92. Behavioural Insights Team, Applying behavioural insights to reduce fraud, error and debt (February 
2012), available at: www.behaviouralinsights.co.uk/publications/fraud-error-and-debt-behavioural-insights-
team-paper.  
93. The Aegeon [2002] EWCA Civ 247; [2002] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 42; [2002] Lloyd’s Rep IR 573; [2003] QB 
556, [45]  
94. Interpart v Lexington [2004] EWHC (Comm); [2004] Lloyd’s Rep IR 690, [43]; Marc Rich Agriculture 
Trading v Fortis Corporate Insurance [2004] EWHC 2631 (Comm); [2005] Lloyd’s Rep IR 396, [28]. 
95. Stemson v AMP [2006] UKPC 30; [2006] 1 Lloyd’s Rep IR 852, [36]. 
96. The DC Merwestone [2014] EWCA Civ 1349; [2015] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 32, [166].  
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In practice, this carefully articulated formulation has proved a very low threshold. The 
lie in The DC Merwestone was the assured’s best guess at what had happened and was, 
only a fortnight later, corroborated by the ship’s master. At best this lie would have 
resulted in quicker payment for the assured.97 This is distinct from the fraudulently 
backdated letter in The Litsion Pride,98 which may have prompted the underwriter to 
make payment ex gratia, notwithstanding an earlier breach of good faith. We are not the 
first to voice concerns that the materiality requirement is not working effectively in 
practice.99 Given the decisive effect of forfeiture on the assured’s claim, it is concerning 
that the courts have not (yet) probed the individual elements of the test rigorously.  
The assured’s account of the loss in The DC Merwestone was provided in response to 
a request for information. This is distinct from a contractual duty to keep the underwriter 
informed during the claims process. On this basis we adopt the analysis favoured in The 
Mercandian Continent,100 where Longmore LJ drew the same distinction in determining 
the scope of a post-contractual duty of utmost good faith. 
 
“If the insurer has a right to information by virtue of an express or an implied term, there may be a 
duty of good faith in the giving of such information… If there is no right in the insurer to be given 
information but he asks for information, no duty of good faith arises as such. The only duty of the 
insured will be not materially to misrepresent the facts in anything he does say to insurers. If he 
does make any such misrepresentation, the insurer will have ordinary common law remedies for 
any loss he has suffered.” 
 
On this analysis, the underwriter in The DC Merwestone would be left to the common 
law to seek a remedy and Christopher Clarke LJ’s assertion that the forfeiture rule 
operates by virtue of the doctrine of utmost good faith is unfounded.  
A related issue concerns information held by the underwriter. In pre-contractual 
misrepresentation, courts have distinguished situations where false information was provided, 
but not relied upon, because the other party had a superior source of information, from those 
where the misrepresentee had the opportunity to verify the information but chose not to do 
so.101 The underwriter in The DC Merwestone had initially gathered information from crew 
interviews and later sought an account of the casualty from the assured. It cannot be 
determined from the reported facts whether the underwriter’s decision not to pursue or further 
investigate a due diligence defence was based on the crew interviews or the insured’s 
response. The DC Merwestone may signal the development of a specialist 
 
 
 
97. It is doubtful whether quicker payment meets the test outlined in The Aegeon [2002] EWCA Civ 247  
[2002] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 42; [2002] Lloyd’s Rep IR 573; [2003] QB 556. Quicker payment had been identified as 
fraudulent in Wisenthal v World Auxiliary Insurance Corp (1930) 38 Ll Rep 54, 62 but was only deemed “of 
interest” by Mance LJ in The Aegeon [2002] EWCA Civ 247; [2002] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 42; [2002] Lloyd’s Rep IR 
573; [2003] QB 556, [29] in developing the materiality threshold applicable to devices.  
98. [1985] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 437, 507.  
99. A Bugra and R Merkin, “‘Fraud’ and fraudulent claims” (2012) 125 BILA LJ 3, 6; Clarke, Law of 
Insurance Contracts, 4th edn (2014), [27.2B4]; Law Commission, Reforming Insurance Contract Law: Issues 
Paper 7: The Insured’s Post-Contractual Duty of Good Faith (July 2010), [3.15].  
100. K/S Merc-Scandia XXII v Certain Lloyd’s Underwriters (The Mercandian Continent) [2001] EWCA 
Civ 1275; [2001] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 563, [22]. 
101. Contrast the cases of Redgrave v Hurd (1881) 20 Ch D 1 and Atwood v Small (1838) 6 Cl & F 232.  
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branch of post-contractual misrepresentation, although the precise tests applicable to 
issues of materiality, inducement and reliance are not yet settled comprehensively.102  
In situations where the duty to provide information is contractual, Longmore LJ’s later 
analysis is useful. In setting an overarching principle as to when avoidance would be 
appropriate for post-contractual breaches of good faith, the court in The Mercandian 
Continent103 held obiter that 
 
“the conduct of the assured which is relied upon by underwriters must be causally relevant to 
underwriters’ ultimate liability or, at least, to some defence of underwriters before it can be 
permitted to avoid the policy. This is, I think, the same concept as that underwriters must be 
seriously prejudiced by the fraud complained of before the policy can be avoided”. 
 
Our concern is to ensure that the lie, objectively assessed, is of sufficient magnitude to 
justify forfeiture of the claim. We agree with Mance LJ that this should consider the potential 
of the claim to influence the insurer.104 The fact that a lie is disbelieved ought not to deprive 
the underwriter of a defence. A subjective test is inappropriate. What kinds of lies then can be 
assumed to break the cooperative relationship between the parties to the extent that the claim 
should be forfeit? Whilst Mance LJ’s formulation in The Aegeon sought to bring clarity, we 
suggest that this is an area where an “open textured” test would be more suitable. We have in 
mind the approach in The Mercandian Continent of Longmore LJ, who spoke of equivalence 
to repudiatory breach. Given that an underwriter would often have a common law damages 
claim (in tort) against a fraudulent insured, we propose the test suggested by Buckley LJ in 
respect of innominate terms: 
 
“Will the consequences… be such that it would be unfair to the injured party to hold him to the 
contract and leave him to his remedy in damages […]? If this would be so, then a repudiation has 
taken place.”105 
 
This will need to be expressed in such a way as to encompass situations, as in The DC 
Merwestone, where the insured is not performing a contractual duty. Moreover, it needs 
explicitly to reflect that it is the potential of the lie, and not its actual effect, that is 
measured. That, we believe, is well within the capacity of the Supreme Court to ensure.  
Courts have often demonstrated an aversion to extending to underwriters contractual 
remedies for which they could have bargained.106 The International Hulls Clauses 2003 
contain such a clause and were available to the parties in this dispute. They chose to 
contract on other terms. 
 
 
 
102. See eg G McMeel, “The FSA’s insurance conduct of business regime: A revolution in (consumer) 
insurance law?” [2005] LMCLQ 186, 193–194, 204 on the enforcement of ICOBS claims-handling rules by 
private persons under the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000, s.150.  
103. [2001] EWCA Civ 1275; [2001] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 563, [28].  
104. The Aegeon [2002] EWCA Civ 247; [2002] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 42; [2002] Lloyd’s Rep IR 573; [2003] QB 
556, [37].  
105. Decro-Wall International SA v Practitioners in Marketing Ltd [1971] 1 WLR 361 (CA), 380, per 
Buckley LJ, approved Federal Commerce & Navigation Co Ltd v Molena Alpha Inc (The Nanfri) [1979] 1 
Lloyd’s Rep 201, 210; [1979] AC 757, 779.  
106. The Star Sea [2001] UKHL 1; [2001] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 389; [2001] Lloyd’s Rep IR 247; [2003] 1 AC 
469, [61], per Lord Hobhouse.  
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If we accept the need to create a distinct rule for judging the legal significance of 
fraudulent device claims, the lack of an effective materiality threshold is problematic. 
The judgment in The DC Merwestone translates a tentatively proposed obiter test into 
law with the consequence that a greater number of statements may result in the forfeiture 
of otherwise valid claims. This fails to recognise that misleading information may be 
given either in satisfaction of a contractual duty or as an indication of the assured’s 
cooperation during the claims process. This may, in hard cases, leave the insurer with an 
undeserved windfall, even though the lie may have borne little or no relation to their 
handling of the claim. 
 
The lack of reciprocity 
 
We have written elsewhere on the need for the forfeiture rule to fit within the broader 
context of insurance contract law, and will summarise our findings here.107 There is, at 
present, no substantive insurance contract rule that requires insurers to handle insurance 
claims in a timely or professional fashion. There is consequently no orthodox remedy 
(beyond the award of interest) to compensate policyholders for the late (or non-) 
payment of an insurance claim.108 There is such a duty embedded in regulation, but this 
is enforceable only by private parties.109 In one notable case declining to create a 
common law rule to this effect, Mance LJ noted that such a duty would (presumably) 
have to be reciprocal, imposing duties on the insured.110 We do accept that in later 
litigation111 Mance LJ adopted a “minimal intervention” default in classifying claims 
notification duties imposed on the insured. He has not developed the “insured bad faith 
in claims” obligation in a similarly restrictive fashion.  
Identifying an “insurer bad faith” comparator to The DC Merwestone is no simple 
task, given that there is no established cause of action for an insured to pursue. 
Moreover, such instances are likely to be rare. We note, however, in Widefree Ltd v Brit 
Insurance Ltd112 that the insurer’s claims adjuster asserted that there was a breach of the 
“Fidelity warranty” in the giving of false information in the presentation of the claim, 
although this was not pursued at trial. Leaver QC (sitting as a Deputy High Court Judge) 
remarked in his judgment:113 
 
 
 
107. Davey [2006] LMCLQ 223.  
108. We have argued elsewhere that an application of “Blake” style damages to strip the defendant of profits 
gained on breach might be available: see Davey, supra fn.41. Cf A-G v Blake [2001] 1 AC 268.  
109. See eg McMeel [2005] LMCLQ 186, 193–194, 204 on the enforcement of ICOBS claims handling 
rules by private persons under the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000, s.150.  
110. Insurance Corp of the Channel Islands Ltd v McHugh [1997] LRLR 94, 136: “If any such term existed 
at all, it would, presumably, have to be mutual. In other words, there would be a duty on the insured to present 
and progress the claim with reasonable speed and efficiency. Just as insurers would be obliged not reasonably 
to refuse or delay indemnity, so, presumably, the insured would be under a duty not unreasonably to delay, 
misstate or overstate his case.”  
111. Friends Provident Life & Pensions Ltd v Sirius International Insurance [2005] EWCA Civ 601; [2006]  
1 Lloyd’s Rep IR 45, [33]. 
112. [2009] EWHC 3671 (QB); [2011] Lloyd’s Rep IR 63. 
113. Ibid, [62–63].  
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“There was no basis upon which the Insurers could have concluded that that was false information. 
That assertion is unsupported by any evidence. … I have to say that I find it astonishing that 
responsible Insurers and loss adjusters could make an allegation of Infidelity without any 
supporting evidence.” 
 
We make no comment whatsoever about the state of mind of insurer (and loss 
adjuster) here. We do think that this is an unsupported assertion of a defence that, if 
believed, might have improved the insurer’s position when seeking to force a settlement. 
We ask where is the draconian response to behaviour of this type? Either the parties are 
being required to act cooperatively, and in good faith, or they are permitted to act in their 
own selfish interests. We see no justification for forcing the insured to negotiate in good 
faith but leaving the underwriter to be restrained solely by reputational factors. We 
develop this analysis below, in Part V.  
We note that the Law Commissions, and a wide range of commentators, supported the 
introduction of a statutory duty on insurers to handle claims without negligence or bad 
faith. Even this was unable to secure industry support. There have been mutterings of 
concern about replicating the US “bad faith” model, which stalled the legislative 
process.114 The “bad faith” doctrine in the US was only an existential threat to insurance 
coverage in a very few States, for a brief period. Moreover, the US legal system utilises 
jury trials and exemplary damages in tort in a manner that skews any attempt at simple 
comparison.115 Furthermore, the “bad faith” principle is now recognised by many (in its 
developed state) as an efficient response to the opportunistic abuses of bargaining power 
identified in US insurance markets.116 Put simply, the UK proposals bore none of the 
characteristics of the problematic variants of the US approach.  
Our basic question here is: what remedy (of a similarly draconian nature) does English 
insurance contract law impose on an underwriter who, during negotiations, recklessly asserts 
that facts exist that would constitute a defence to the claim? Moreover, would that draconian 
remedy be imposed even if the underwriter’s assertion were later corroborated?  
This section demonstrates that the forfeiture rule developed in a legal environment 
that sees English courts resisting calls to develop a cause of action for insureds whose 
underwriters fail to pay and where a Law Commission proposal to provide a remedy for 
reckless or wilful failure to pay was viewed as too controversial for inclusion in a Law 
Commission Bill.117 Those same lawmakers have developed, and then partly codified, 
the forfeiture rule. This inconsistency should not go unnoticed. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
114. See eg the discussion of amendments tabled to the Insurance Bill 2014: 
www.parliament.uk/documents/ HoL-Legislation-Offi ce/Special-Public-Bill-Committees/Insurance-Bill/Oral-
Evidence/Special-Public-Bill-Committee-transcript-15-12-14.pdf.  
115. T Baker, Insurance Law & Policy, 2nd edn (Aspen Publishers, New York, 2008), 114–123. The rapid 
cooling of the (initially) intensely fierce debate over bad faith damages in the Unites States is well described by 
a leading commentator in K Abraham, “The Natural History of the Insurer’s Liability for Bad Faith” (1994) 72 
Tex L Rev 1295.  
116. K Abraham, “Liability for Bad Faith and the Principle Without A Name (Yet)” (2012) 19 Conn Ins LJ 1.  
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Draconian approach not mirrored elsewhere 
 
The determinedly draconian nature of forfeiture is not matched elsewhere, not least in how 
the criminal law treats insurance fraudsters. Sentencing under the Fraud Act 2006 depends 
upon the culpability of the offender, degree of planning and the level of financial gain.118 In 
the tort context, the Supreme Court has rejected the view that strike-out of exaggerated 
claims was the only way to deter personal injury fraud and preferred to compensate the actual 
harm and achieve deterrence through other means.119 The approach in Summers has recently 
been replaced by the Criminal Justice and Courts Act 2015, s.57, which provides that courts 
must dismiss a claim where the claimant has been fundamentally dishonest, unless dismissal 
would result in substantial injustice. This gives courts a degree of discretion to tailor their 
response to the circumstances of the case. We contend that a peculiarly draconian approach is 
not justified by reference to policy in insurance law alone. Moreover, once it is recognised 
that other relationships, not “of the utmost good faith”, have issues of information asymmetry 
and similar information-forcing obligations to overcome the inequality, then a special 
insurance rule becomes unjustified.120  
These critiques question the practical operation, internal coherence and wider context 
of the forfeiture rule. Viewed together, we suggest that this undermines the deterrence 
argument as a control for fraudulent insurance claims. We now seek to show that 
insurance contract law is not unique in facing these issues, by reference to employment 
law and relational contract theory. 
 
 
V. FORFEITURE AS A RULE SUI GENERIS? THE SPECTRUM OF FRAUDULENT 
INDEMNIFICATION CLAIMS 
 
For Christopher Clarke LJ in The DC Merwestone, the forfeiture rule in insurance 
contract law was a product of the doctrine of utmost good faith and stands alone.121 Our 
approach is different. We question the assumption that the information asymmetries that 
led to the development of the utmost good faith doctrine are found in insurance alone. 
That English law developed information-sharing duties in a haphazard fashion is well 
known, but this certainly does not make insurance unique in facing this policy 
concern.122 In this piece we argue that the forfeiture rule properly conceived is merely 
part of a broader spectrum of rules governing the submission of a claim for contractual 
indemnification. Moreover, the use of fraud in the claim brings in a further neighbouring 
principle: the doctrine of ex turpi causa non oritur actio. 
 
 
117. Supra, fn.114.  
118. Sentencing Council, Fraud, Bribery and Money Laundering Offences Definitive Guideline (2014) 
available at: sentencingcouncil.judiciary.gov.uk/docs/Fraud_bribery_and_money_laundering_offences_-_ 
Definitive_guideline.pdf.  
119. Summers v Fairclough Homes [2012] UKSC 26; [2013] Lloyd’s Rep IR 159; [2012] 1 WLR 2004, 
[50–60]. 
120. FD Rose, “Information Asymmetry and the Myth of Good Faith” [2007] LMCLQ 181, 194–195.  
121. The DC Merwestone [2014] EWCA Civ 1349; [2015] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 32, [76–77], per Christopher Clarke LJ.  
122. Rose [2007] LMCLQ 181.  
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When combined, this provides the obvious comparator of the submission of a 
fraudulently enhanced expenses claim under an employment contract. In this Part we 
consider the approach of the legal system to employee fraud (and its contractual 
consequences) and note the development of mutual duties of trust and confidence in that 
sphere, analogous to the doctrine of utmost good faith. In order to explain why English 
law has permitted these information-forcing rules, in the face of what is supposedly a 
free-market, capitalist model, we refer to insights from relational contract theory.  
We recognise that under a formal legal analysis it is possible to differentiate insurance 
claims and a request for indemnification for expenses in an employment context. One 
obvious example is the counter-intuitive model used to explain the insurer’s obligation 
to pay the contractual indemnity under English law—the much criticised “hold 
harmless” principle.123 Moreover, the precise legal basis on which expense claims are 
recovered will vary. However, it is our view that many of these differences are historical 
accident and merely show the era in which the juridical basis for the indemnity first 
arose, and do not provide any genuine basis for differentiation. There will either be a 
contractual duty to cooperate in the submission of claims, or it will be a non-contractual 
process. Put simply, we can see no justification for the widely divergent legal response 
to the submission of a genuine claim for indemnification of a loss incurred, albeit one 
supported by fraudulent evidence (or a fraudulently incomplete account).  
We begin, however, by rejecting a comparator which has been commonly used—the 
pre-contractual fraudulent misrepresentation—and explain why. 
 
Finding analogues: distinguishing fraud in the claims process and pre-contractual 
fraud 
 
We deal here with a frequently asserted position: that the fraudulent claims jurisdiction 
in insurance has a reliable comparator in fraud during the negotiation of the contract.124 
We have chosen not to adopt this as our analogue and should explain our choice. It is not 
simply because the pre-contractual approach is not consistent with our preferred 
approach at claims. Even under the avowedly proportionate model under the Insurance 
Act 2015, pre-contractual fraud (whether by non-disclosure or positive 
misrepresentation) provides for the remedy of avoidance ab initio.125 Moreover, under 
general contract law there is no statutory discretion (eg, such as that under the 
Misrepresentation Act 1967, s.2(2)) applicable to fraudulent misstatements.  
We do not consider in detail the pre-contractual position, on the basis that the law relating 
to vitiating factors is not a useful guide to the law relating to contractual performance. 
Moreover, in many of the cases considered under the forfeiture rule, the insured is not 
performing a contractual duty at all. Claims cooperation clauses requiring the insured to 
assist the insurer in its investigation of the loss are not universal, and none appears to have 
been in place in The DC Merwestone. This was voluntary assistance, undertaken in the 
shadow of the law and of market norms. The insured that refuses to go beyond 
 
123. Supra, fn.40.  
124. This point was well made by an anonymous referee and deserves a response here.  
125. Insurance Act 2015, s.8(2), Sch.1(2).  
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mere notice of his claim pre-trial may risk triggering suspicions from its insurer, and 
may affect its recovery of costs at trial, but it is not—without express contractual 
obligation— in breach of any duty.126 The question for the court in The DC Merwestone 
is what sanction to impose on a contractual party who is fraudulent in a contract-related, 
but not contract-performing, situation.  
In the post-contractual sphere, the parties have either provided for an express term of 
the contract to govern the situation or it will be answered by reference to an implied term 
of the contract or some positive rule of law. The reason for the dispute in The DC 
Merwestone was that the parties have not included an express fraudulent claims clause. 
These are not unknown in marine insurance contracts and indeed a standard form clause 
to that end was included in the International Hulls Clauses from 2003 onwards.127  
This failure to contract, we argue, changes the nature of the situation. The court is 
establishing a default rule in the absence of any contractual indication from the parties. 
Much ink has been spilt on whether silence can be equated to consent to the default rule 
and we do not wish to reopen that debate.128 Rather, we contend that: 
 
(1) the choice of a performance default rule (whether contractual or a positive rule of 
law) is different in nature from establishing the conditions of proper negotiation of 
the putative contract;  
(2) insurance contract law should therefore look to the treatment of fraudulent claims for 
the reimbursement of funds in other contractual arena;  
(3) in setting the default, the courts should not overlook the parties’ opportunity to stipulate 
for a rule of their choice, and should adopt a position of minimal intervention; and  
(4) a fortiori, the choice of a post-contractual, performance-related (but not performance 
itself) default should be limited in scope and remedy. 
 
Fraud and the “relational” insurance contract 
 
The concept of a relational contract is well established in contracts scholarship, but less 
commonly referenced in commercial law articles, so a brief introduction is given here.129 The 
notion of a relational model of contract theory (properly understood) argues that contracts lie 
on an axis, with the poles represented by “discrete” and “highly relational” agreements. In 
truth, all contracts are relational in some sense, so it is the degree to which 
 
 
126. We are grateful to Michael Davey QC for a useful discussion on this point.  
127. International Hull Clauses (01/11/03), cl.45.3: “It shall be a condition precedent to the liability of the 
Underwriters that the Assured shall not at any stage prior to the commencement of legal proceedings 
knowingly or recklessly  
cl 45.3.1 mislead or attempt to mislead the Underwriters in the proper consideration of a claim or the 
settlement thereof by relying on any evidence which is false  
cl 45.3.2 conceal any circumstance or matter from the Underwiters material to the proper consideration of 
a claim or a defence to such a claim.”  
128. See eg R Barnett, “The Sound of Silence: Default Rules and Contractual Consent” (1992) 78 Va L Rev  
821.  
129. A useful introduction, spanning a range of contract issues, is found in D Campbell and H Collins, 
“Discovering the Implicit Dimensions of Contracts”, in D Campbell, H Collins and J Wightman (eds), Implicit 
dimensions of contract: Discrete, relational and network contracts (Hart, Oxford, 2003).  
336 LLOYD’S MARITIME AND COMMERCIAL LAW QUARTERLY 
 
they are relational that is significant. A highly relational contractual arrangement will be 
understood by the parties to be implemented according to a wide variety of customs and 
norms not referenced in the agreement itself. Indeed, the basis of the parties’ mutual 
rights and obligations will often be the tacit norms that underpin their relationship, and 
not their contract itself. Highly relational agreements are often long-term and will 
normally require the agreement to adapt and change to circumstances. This does not 
mean that all agreements must be enforced or interpreted in some richly contextual, 
“ignore the text”, fashion: often the commercial context requires us to look at the words 
on the page alone.130 Relational contract theory is therefore a neutral tool, and is not 
indicative of an a priori preference for standards rather than strict rules.131  
Let us assume that insurance contracts are best understood as lying on the “more 
relational” end of this axis.132 Gordon has identified two key, but potentially conflicting, 
influences on the performance of contractual relationships: solidarity and power. First, 
solidarity:133 
 
“In the ‘relational’ view of Macaulay and Macneil, parties treat their contracts more like marriages 
than like one-night stands. Obligations grow out of the commitment that they have made to one 
another, and the conventions that the trading community establishes for such commitments; they 
are not frozen at the initial moment of commitment, but change as circumstances change; the 
object of contracting is not primarily to allocate risks, but to signify a commitment to cooperate. In 
bad times parties are expected to lend one another mutual support, rather than standing on their 
rights; each will treat the other’s insistence on literal performance as wilful obstructionism; if 
unexpected contingencies occur resulting in severe losses, the parties are to search for equitable 
ways of dividing the losses; and the sanction for egregiously bad behaviour, is always, of course, 
refusal to deal again.” 
 
Second, power:134 
 
“In the messy and open-ended world of continuing contract relations, where the contours of 
obligation are constantly shifting, the effects of power imbalances are not limited to the 
concessions that parties can extort in the original bargain. Such imbalances tend to generate 
hierarchies that can gradually extend to govern every aspect of the relation in performance. This is 
the potential dark side of continuing contract relations, as organic solidarity is the bright side: what 
starts out as a mere inequity in market power can be deepened into persistent domination on one 
side and dependence on the other.” 
 
We recognise that insurance products are not homogeneous, but most disputes (and 
certainly the one in The DC Merwestone) can better be understood as a product of the 
tension between these norms. The insurer can persuasively argue that the insured has 
 
130. I Macneil, “Relational Contract Theory After a Neo-Classical Seminar” in Campbell, Collins and 
Wightman, ibid.  
131. D Campbell, “Arcos v Ronaasen as a Relational Contract”, in D Campbell, L Mulcahy and S Wheeler, 
Changing Concepts of Contract (Palgrave Macmillan, London, 2013).  
132. On insurance as a relational agreement, see J Feinman, “The insurance relationship and relational 
contract and the ‘fairly debateable’ rule for first-party bad faith” (2009) 46(3) San Diego L Rev 553.  
133. R Gordon, “Macaulay, Macneil, and the Discovery of Solidarity and Power in Contract Law” (1985) 
Wis L Rev 565, 569. To those who say that an insurance policy only operates to allocate risks, we would ask 
them to find an insurer that routinely enforces all legal rights against insureds irrespective of commercial and 
market pressures. Insurance is like a rugby scrum—there are many more offences committed than penalties.  
134. Ibid, 570.  
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the power, with control over the narrative that underpins the claim, and control over the 
evidence that establishes that narrative. By contrast, the insured can assert that it is the 
insurer who sets the rules and umpires the claims game.135 Even if the insured is subject 
to agreed duties of cooperation during claims, its position is stark: failure to be honest 
deprives it of its sunk investment, the premium and the cover it obtained. The crucial 
loss is the cover. The insured can recover from this underwriter or none. It cannot go 
back into the market after the loss has occurred. Insurance law has, predominately, 
listened to the first argument, that from the insurer. The obligations of mutual utmost 
good faith (and many others in insurance law) are, in practice, largely designed to 
protect the underwriter from the insured’s failing to act cooperatively.136 Much of the 
focus of the Insurance Act 2015 was to redraw this balance.  
In essence, the insured’s argument is that the underwriter’s strict insistence on proof, 
and its vigorous reliance on defences (recall that the underwriter failed at first instance to 
establish any of the other defences it ran) are the “wilful obstructionism” identified by 
Gordon as contrary to solidarity of contractual purpose. Moreover, given the human 
rights dimension in this case, it can argue that the insurer’s claim violates wider social 
norms, when responding disproportionately.  
What is needed then is to step away, briefly, from the insurance context, and to ask 
how other similar contractual conflicts are resolved. As noted above, we seek examples 
of fraud in performance rather than creation of agreements. In doing so, we recognise 
that our selection of two comparators (ex turpi causa and employment law) is a limited 
field. A broader study is beyond the scope of this paper. We would, as ever, be delighted 
to respond in the future to rebuttals based on other comparators and perhaps other 
jurisdictions. We do at least seek to show that the insurance approach is not the only 
viable model in English contract law. 
 
Judicial consideration of a nuanced model: the illegality defence 
 
There are clear points of comparison between the insurance forfeiture rule and the illegality 
defence in general contract law. Both attempt to prevent recovery where the claimant has 
engaged in dishonest conduct. But the consequences of each rule’s invocation varies 
considerably; whereas forfeiture permits the insurer to recover monies paid in connection 
with the fraudulent claim and refuse to pay outstanding sums, the operation of ex turpi causa 
simply leaves the loss to lie where it falls. 137 Both the courts and policymakers have recently 
engaged in discussion about the correct scope of the rules, but the themes of those (ongoing) 
discussions were different. What we attempt briefly to show here is that, while insurance 
courts consistently reaffirm the forfeiture rule, the illegality courts are much more willing to 
examine the policy basis for the defence. 
 
135. For a forceful commentary in support of such a view, see J Feinman, Delay, Deny, Defend (Penguin, 
London, 2010).  
136. H Cousy, “About sanctions and the hybrid nature of modern insurance contract law” [2012] Erasmus 
LR 123, 123–124.  
137. This stems from a desire to protect the morality of the court, although it is a far less convincing 
explanation today, as argued by Lord Sumption, “Reflections on the Law of Illegality” [2012] Restitution Law 
Review 1, 2–3.  
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The maxim ex turpi causa is easily stated. The authoritative expression is located in 
the speech of Lord Mansfield in Holman v Johnson:138 
 
“The objection, that a contract is immoral or illegal as between plaintiff and defendant sounds at 
all times very ill in the mouth of the defendant. It is not for his sake, however, that the objection is 
ever allowed; but it is founded in general principles of policy … No Court will lend its aid to a 
man who founds his cause of action upon an immoral or an illegal act.” 
 
The two centuries of case law which follow this exposition have given rise to a 
number of rules accompanied with a similar number of exceptions. The result is a body 
of law which is incoherent and complex.139 Part of the problem lies in the simultaneous 
development of the maxim in different areas of the law and the fact that it asks courts to 
refuse a claimant remedies to which he would ordinarily be entitled. A comprehensive 
account of the defence is beyond the scope of this article140 but this will instead chart the 
fluctuations of the judicial approach to the nature of the defence.  
Early case law demonstrated the court’s refusal to yield to circumstance. A contract 
which contravened statute without the knowledge of either party was unenforceable141 
and so too the policy of insurance following the outbreak of war due to one party’s status 
as an enemy alien.142 Both the nature of the pleadings and the substance of the dispute 
were relevant in the judicial recognition of the defence.143  
The consequences of the maxim’s invocation are problematic, as it may give an 
undeserving litigant a generous windfall, while his equally dishonest adversary is left 
without a legal remedy. There is no consideration of the claimant’s degree of culpability 
and restitutionary claims are not permitted.144  
In an effort to evade these arbitrary consequences, a series of cases in the 1980s developed 
the idea that the defence would be available only where enforcement of the claim would 
constitute an affront to the public conscience.145 This was defined by the Court of Appeal 
 
138. (1775) 1 Cowp 341, 743; 98 ER 1120, 1121. There is evidence that the maxim was in operation at 
least 50 years earlier. See Everet v Williams (1725) Unreported; noted (1893) 9 LQR 197 (commonly referred 
to as “The Highwayman’s Case”).  
139. Sumption [2012] Restitution Law Review 1; Les Laboratoires Servier v Apotex Inc [2012] EWCA Civ 
593; [2013] Bus LR 80, [63], per Etherton LJ, where he held that a consideration of all the illegality cases 
would be “complex, very lengthy, and in large part unrewarding. The decisions inevitably turn on their own 
particular facts … The jurisprudence in this areas has been an evolving one, but its evolution has not followed 
a consistent pattern”.  
140. Readers are directed to R Buckley, Illegality and Public Policy, 3rd edn (Sweet & Maxwell, London, 
2013) for a comprehensive account of the defence. 
141. JM Allan (Merchandising) Ltd v Cloke [1963] 2 QB 340. 
142. Oom v Bruce (1810) 2 East 225; 104 ER 87. Neither party was aware that war had begun.  
143. Mance (2014) 18 Edin L Rev 175, 179. In Pearce v Brooks (1866) 1 LR Ex 213, the court refused to 
enforce a prima facie valid contract for the hire of a brougham because both parties knew that the hirer, who 
worked as a prostitute, would use it to attract clients. The importance attached to the substance of the dispute 
no longer appears to be so relevant; see the later discussion of Tinsley v Milligan [1994] 1 AC 340.  
144. Cf the position in insurance fraud, where the insurer is entitled to reclaim interim payments made prior 
to the discovery of the fraud and is not liable for any genuine loss sustained. The Law Commission, Illegal 
transactions (LCCP 154, 1999), [7.69], provisionally proposed giving courts a discretion to enable a person to 
withdraw from an illegal contract and to bring forward a claim in restitution for benefits conferred thereunder.  
145. In Moore Stephens v Stone & Rolls Ltd [2009] UKHL 39; [2009] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 537; [2009] 1 AC 1391, [20] 
the public conscience test was traced to the case of Thackwell v Barclays Bank [1986] 1 All ER 676, although the 
court noted a reference 15 years earlier in Gray v Barr [1971] 2 QB 554, 581. In Euro-Diam Ltd v  
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as requiring the court to “weigh, or balance, the adverse consequences of granting relief 
against the adverse consequences of refusing relief. The ultimate decision calls for a 
value judgment”.146 Less than a decade later, however, this flexibility was unanimously 
rejected by the House of Lords on the grounds that it was uncertain and unprincipled.147  
A narrow majority held that the existence of an illegal contract was irrelevant if the 
claimant could establish an independent proprietary right without relying on his own 
illegality.148 This reliance test has become the primary exception to the illegality defence 
but does nothing to answer the criticism that the maxim operates arbitrarily. The facts of 
Tinsley v Milligan149 illustrate the point.150 Here, a couple bought a house which was 
conveyed solely into the name of Ms Tinsley to enable Ms Milligan dishonestly to claim 
social security benefits in her apparent capacity as a lodger. When the house was sold 
following the couple’s separation, Tinsley sought to keep the entire price. Milligan 
succeeded in her claim for a proportion of the sale price, as she could establish the 
existence of a resulting trust, created by her contribution to the purchase price. There 
was no need to bring forward evidence of their illegal scheme. By way of contrast, in 
Collier v Collier,151 a father conveyed valuable property into his daughter’s name with 
the intention to defeat claims by his creditors. Having cleared his debts independently of 
the intended fraud, he sought to regain control of the property but his daughter refused. 
His claim was unsuccessful, as he would have needed to bring evidence of his dishonest 
intention to defeat the presumption of advancement that the transfer was a gift. The 
contrasting results are further difficult to reconcile on the basis that the fraudulent 
scheme succeeded in Tinsley but was not carried out in Collier. The proposition that 
courts are concerned by the pleadings and the substance of the case is accordingly open 
to question in light of the result in Tinsley.  
The reliance test was initially viewed as being of general application152 but later 
judgments sought to confine it to cases where property was transferred pursuant to an 
illegal contract.153 This line of cases advocated a more contextual approach in which 
consideration was made of the relevant policy concerns and particular circumstances of 
the wrongdoing.  
The unhappy circumstances of Gray v Thames Trains154 are well known and indicate a 
major departure from the reliance test. Although the damages claims were dismissed, Lord 
Hoffmann elucidated the nature of the illegality defence, citing “a group of reasons, which 
vary in different situations”.155 The suggestion that trivial offences and those for which the 
 
Bathurst [1990] 1 QB 1 a review of the case law was conducted and the court distilled a common approach: the 
public conscience test. 
146. Tinsley v Milligan [1992] Ch 310, 319, per Nicholls LJ.  
147. Tinsley v Milligan [1994] 1 AC 340, 369 (per Lord Browne-Wilkinson), 363 (per Lord Goff of 
Chieveley).  
148. Ibid, 367 (per Lord Jauncey of Tullichettle), 369 (per Lord Lowry), 376 (per Lord Browne-Wilkinson).  
149. [1994] 1 AC 340. 
150. R Buckley, “Illegal transactions: chaos or discretion?” (2002) 20 (2) LS 155, 179. 
151. [2002] EWCA Civ 1095; [2002] BPIR 1057.  
152. Standard Chartered Bank v Pakistan National Shipping Corp (No 2) [2000] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 218, 7 (per 
Aldous LJ), 44 (per Evans LJ).  
153. Moore Stephens v Stone & Rolls [2009] UKHL 39; [2009] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 537; [2009] 1 AC 1391, 
[21], where the reliance test was criticised as overly technical. 
154. [2009] UKHL 33; [2009] 1 AC 1339; [2009] LS Law Med 409. 
155. Ibid, [30].  
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offender was not personally responsible may be beyond the scope of the maxim further 
evidences the development of a contextual approach at this time.156  
Later case law further struggled to reconcile the reliance test with Lord Mansfield’s 
articulation of the defence.157 The courts instead determined that the operation of the defence 
would depend on a consideration of the policy factors underlying the maxim, although there 
was some dispute about what these were.158 The defence would be available where it was a 
“just and proportionate response to the illegality involved in the light of the policy 
considerations underlying it”.159 The courts eschewed the idea that this was simply a return to 
the public conscience test160 and instead depended upon “an intense analysis of the particular 
facts and of the proper application of the various policy considerations”.161  
The development of a more nuanced defence was once again stunted by the Supreme 
Court in Les Laboratoires Servier v Apotex Inc.162 Interestingly, despite attempts by the 
Court of Appeal to construct a test based on considerations of justice and 
proportionality, the Supreme Court was not asked to reconsider the law as stated in 
Tinsley.163 Accordingly, the most recent exposition of the illegality defence reiterates the 
reliance test established some two decades previously.  
The Law Commission has undertaken significant consultation in this area but decided 
not to recommend statutory intervention for contractual illegality. 164 This reversal of 
their previous position was heavily influenced by the incremental developments being 
made by case law.165 This decision, however, was taken at the height of the construction 
of a contextual approach and before the Supreme Court decision in Les Laboratoires 
Servier. Lord Toulson, a keen advocate of the nuanced test,166 recognised that in an 
appropriate case Tinsley may need to be reconsidered in light of subsequent case law and 
Law Commission consultation.167  
We said at the outset of this section that the forfeiture rule and the illegality defence 
were worthy comparators. The courts have demonstrated a clear willingness to consider 
the circumstances of the wrongdoing in deciding whether the illegality defence applies. 
 
 
156. Ibid, [15] (per Lord Phillips of Worth Matravers), [83] (per Lord Rodger of Earlsferry).  
157. Moore Stephens v Stone & Rolls [2009] UKHL 39; [2009] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 537; [2009] 1 AC 1391, [23], [26].  
158. Ibid, [26], per Lord Phillips: (i) the court’s refusal to enforce transactions forbidden by performance or 
illegal in performance; and (ii) the claimant’s inability to recover a benefit following their own wrongdoing. A 
similar policy-based approach was taken in Les Laboratoires Servier [2012] EWCA Civ 593; [2013] Bus LR 
80 by the Court of Appeal, which identified the relevant policies as follows: furthering the purpose of the rule 
which the illegal conduct has infringed, consistency of the law, deterrence, refusal to enable a claimant to 
profit from his own wrong and maintaining the integrity of the legal system; see ibid, [73] (per Etherton LJ), 
[94] ( per Laws LJ). 
159. Ibid, [73] (per Etherton LJ), [94] (per Laws LJ).  
160. For the opposing view, see R Merkin, “Tort and insurance: some insurance law perspectives” (2012) 
JPN 194, 213. 
161. Les Laboratoires Servier [2012] EWCA Civ 593; [2013] Bus LR 80, [73], [75]. 
162. [2014] UKSC 55; [2015] 1 AC 430. 
163. Ibid, [19]. 
164. Law Commission, The Illegality Defence (LCCP 189, 2009), [3.37–3.41]  
165. Ibid, [3.124]. However, note Lord Sumption’s dismay at this conclusion: Sumption [2012] Restitution 
Law Review 1, 9: “I think that this retreat is extremely unfortunate, for I am not nearly as sanguine about the 
current state of the law as the Law Commission is.”  
166. ParkingEye Ltd v Somerfield Stores Ltd [2012] EWCA Civ 1338; [2012] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 679, [52–55]. 
167. Les Laboratoires Servier [2014] UKSC 55; [2015] 1 AC 430, [64].  
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The recent Supreme Court judgment has put an end to this, at least for now, but it 
appears that a shift in approach is more likely in relation to illegality than insurance 
fraud. We now turn to the approach of the courts to fraudulent employment claims in 
search of further examples of judicial regulation of fraud beyond “utmost good faith”. 
 
Judicial development of a nuanced model: fraudulent conduct in the employment 
relationship 
 
Employment contracts are not generally contracts of the “utmost good faith” but there 
are standard implied terms of “good faith” and mutual “trust and confidence”.168 What 
these obligations have in common is an ongoing obligation to act within the terms of the 
relationship and not merely the express contract terms as agreed at formation— a 
relational contract law approach169—and a need to consider the interests of the other 
party in contractual decision-making (albeit one that often stops short of a fiduciary duty 
per se). The insurance-employment comparison is also made by the authors of Tolley’s 
Employment Law Service in discussion of the implied duty of fidelity:170 
 
“Obviously an employee is required to deal honestly with his employer and to account to his 
employer for all property entrusted to him by his employer or by third parties for or on account of 
his employer. Although the employment contract is not regarded as uberrimae fidei at common 
law, an employee is nevertheless under a fiduciary duty to account to his employer in respect of 
any bribes, secret profits or secret commissions which arise out of the employment. The employee 
is also under a duty to disclose to the employer all information relevant to the employer which he 
obtains in the course of his employment.” 
 
In insurance, the doctrine developed in a remarkably lop-sided fashion (as Cousy has 
noted, English insurance law developed to protect the underwriter from the insured171), 
despite the inequality of bargaining power normally running in the opposite direction. 
Employment law is more even-handed, with mutually significant obligations and 
remedies.172 Moreover, insurance law has shied away from using the mutuality of the duties 
as a balancing factor. Thus, for example, the insurer’s right to exercise the remedy granted by 
the doctrine of utmost good faith (avoidance of the contract ab initio for pre-contractual non-
disclosure) has not been treated as limited by the insurer’s own obligations of utmost good 
faith.173 By contrast, in employment, the employer’s right to dismiss might 
 
168. The precise relationship between the right to dismiss and the mutual duties of trust and confidence has 
generated considerable litigation and comment. For a recent overview, see D Brodie, “Common law remedies 
and relational contracting: McNeill v Aberdeen CC (No 2)” (2014) 43 Ind LJ 170. A useful introduction to the 
challenge this poses to neo-classical contract theory is found in D Brodie, “How relational is the employment 
contract?” (2011) 40 Ind LJ 232.  
169. M Boyle, “The Relational Principle of Trust and Confidence” (2007) 27 OJLS 633.  
170. R Mahal, J McMullen et al, Tolley’s Employment Law Service (Lexis-Nexis, Issue 116, Dec 2014), 
[C7022]. 
171. Cousy [2012] Erasmus LR 123, 123–124.  
172. Whilst the doctrine of utmost good faith in insurance is said to be mutual, the remedy (avoidance ab 
initio) is only effective in the hands of the underwriter. For a critique of this result, albeit one overturned on 
appeal, see Banque Keyser Ullman SA v Skandia Ins Co Ltd [1987] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 69, 95–96; [1990] 1 QB 
665, 704–706, per Steyn J.  
173. North Star Shipping Ltd v Sphere Drake Insurance Plc (The North Star) [2006] EWCA Civ 378; [2006] 2 
Lloyd’s Rep 183; Drake Insurance Plc v Provident Insurance Plc [2003] EWCA Civ 1834; [2004] 1 Lloyd’s  
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be limited by the mutual duties of trust and confidence even where the employee had 
been dishonest.174  
In the recent case of Cavenagh v William Evans Ltd,175 the Court of Appeal 
considered the effect on an employment contract, and a subsequent agreement to 
terminate the agreement on redundancy terms, of the employee’s having “wrongfully 
procured” a £10,000 payment to his pension fund. The employment contract contained a 
termination clause for gross misconduct, but the company (unaware at the time of the 
misconduct) instead offered to terminate the employment on the basis of payment in lieu 
of notice. On discovering the illegitimate payment, the company refused to make the 
agreed payment in lieu of notice. The legal question was whether the debt was 
irrecoverable on the basis of the gross misconduct.  
The relationship between company director and company contains a mixture of 
implied obligations to act in good faith, or its functional equivalent. There is the mutual 
duty of trust and confidence and, because of the management responsibilities, fiduciary 
duties on the director. Whilst the company did not rely on any positive duty of disclosure 
on the company director—eg, to reveal his self-interested procurement of the £10,000 
pension provision when negotiating the terms of his dismissal—the Court of Appeal 
confirmed that he owed both duties to maintain trust and confidence and fiduciary 
obligations.176 However, these were not seen as providing an effective remedy to release 
the company from its promise to pay the agreed sum “in lieu of notice”. This debt arose 
on the termination of the agreement by redundancy and was not affected by the later 
discovery of facts that would have entitled them to terminate without compensation:177 
 
“The contract itself did not contain any provision releasing the company from its contractual 
obligation to pay the debt that arose from the exercise of the contractual power on 12 March. The 
contractual right to payment in lieu having accrued, Mr Cavenagh was entitled to payment of it in 
the same way as other sums that had accrued due at the date of dismissal.  
The general law did not release the company from its contractual liability on the only ground 
relied on by the company in this action, namely that it acquired knowledge after it had terminated 
the contract under clause 11.5, which would have entitled it to terminate it outside that clause and 
summarily without liability for pay in lieu.” 
 
The obvious comparator in the insurance realm is Axa General Insurance Ltd v 
Gottlieb,178 where a genuine claim for indemnification for household property damage was 
tainted by the later addition of a dishonest element, for alternative accommodation whilst the 
property was restored. Mance LJ (as he then was) insisted that the timing of the 
 
Rep 268, [88], per Rix LJ: “it may readily be appreciated that, if once an insured has been found wanting in good faith 
in the matter of pre-contractual non-disclosure, it is likely to be hard to conclude that the same doctrine of good faith 
itself prevents the insurer from exercising his right to avoid. On the whole English commercial law has not favoured 
the process of balancing rights and wrongs under a species of what I suppose would now be called a doctrine of 
proportionality. Instead it has sought for stricter and simpler tests and for certainty.” 
174. Brodie (2011) 40 Ind LJ 232.  
175. [2012] EWCA Civ 697; [2013] 1 WLR 238. The facts are reminiscent of the actual (rather than 
litigated) facts of Bell v Lever Bros Ltd [1932] AC 161; C MacMillan, “How Temptation led to Mistake: an 
Explanation of Bell v Lever Bros Ltd” (2003) 119 LQR 625.  
176. Ibid, [35]. 
177. Ibid, [38–39]. 
178. [2005] EWCA Civ 112; [2005] 1 Lloyd’s Rep IR 369.  
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fraud was irrelevant and that the entire claim was tainted by the fraud, even where some 
elements had already been agreed and, in some cases, paid.179  
Within insurance, a commercial sphere without fiduciary obligations, the act of a 
fraudulent claim is taken to deprive the insured of cover not only because there has been 
a repudiatory breach of contract (which requires a reaction—and therefore knowledge— 
from the innocent party to effect) but because there is the “special” rule of forfeiture of 
related benefits. Whether the fraud comes first (but lays undiscovered) or last does not 
matter. As noted above, the justification for this is the oft-stated policy basis for the 
forfeiture rule—the need to deter opportunistic fraud:180 
 
“[The law] will not allow an insured who has made a fraudulent claim to recover. The logic is 
simple. The fraudulent insured must not be allowed to think: if the fraud is successful, then I will 
gain; if it is unsuccessful, I will lose nothing.” 
 
What has not been considered by the courts is why there is no similar rule for fraudulent 
company directors. In the situation in Cavenagh, the normal remedy of dismissal was 
ineffective because dismissal on terms had already been agreed. Moreover, even where 
dismissal is a potential sanction, the courts have not treated it as an absolute sanction but as 
part of the broader examination of the underlying relationship. On this basis, the use of a 
fraudulent invoice to reclaim monies from the employer might well justify dismissal, but that 
is dependent on the normal balancing of the nature of the employee’s breach and the effect 
that has on the ongoing relationship. These issues were litigated in the Scots case of AEI 
Cables Ltd v M’Lay.181 Whilst the precise circumstances of the case are not well reported, it 
was clear that the employee had submitted a falsified invoice for reimbursement of monies 
purportedly spent on obtaining diesel. The discrepancy was spotted internally, and the 
employee dismissed. The court weighed in the balance his twelve-year history of 
employment with the firm, the difficult position of an employer’s having to place trust in an 
employee facing prosecution by the police and the seriousness of the alleged conduct, and 
finally concluded: “The quality of the respondent’s conduct was in this case of such gravity 
that the length of his prior service was of no materiality.”182  
We see no conceptual difficulty in similarly recognising that an insurance contract is a 
relational arrangement in which the precise limits of acceptable conduct cannot be captured 
by the terms of the agreement.183 The consequence of this analysis is that, whilst dishonesty 
would normally violate the norms of behaviour so as to deprive the insured of the benefit of 
the policy, it cannot be said to be true in all cases. On one reading of The DC Merwestone, 
the insured owner guessed (correctly) at an element in the chain of events, but was wrong to 
assert that he had evidence to support his view. Those owners were facing possible financial 
difficulties, despite having purchased insurance to cover this form of loss and having 
cooperated with the insurer’s own investigations. Our difficulty, then, is the application of the 
forfeiture principle in a draconian fashion, even though 
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181. [1980] SC 42. 
182. Ibid, 49. 
183. See Feinman (2009) 46(3) San Diego L Rev 553.  
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there is a broad scale of culpability, and on the claimed basis of deterrence, when no 
such doctrine has emerged in employment law or beyond. 
 
Concluding thoughts on fraud and “relational” contracts 
 
The precise description in a contract of what must be done in the future by each party184 
is normally an unrealistic expectation. This is certainly true in most insurance contracts. 
The cost of drafting a clause that permits minor, inconsequential breaches but catches all 
significant failures would be vast, even if the parties had access to such an imaginative 
draughtsman. Many marine insurance contracts do not even try to describe the 
relationship during claims—they formally require only that the insured give notice of the 
claim, and yet honest cooperation is seemingly expected.  
To the extent that the ongoing relationship between the parties is one of trust and 
mutual reliance, it might be thought that any lie would fracture the relationship. After all, 
honesty is one of few external values to have been recognised by English contract law as 
implicit within contractual relationships.185 We suggest not, at least not in every case. 
Not every lie breaks a marriage. A more balanced approach, recognising that insureds 
often voluntarily incur expense in acting beyond their contractual duties, would weigh 
the causal effect of the fraud. This seems to be at the heart of Longmore LJ’s approach 
to materiality in The Mercandian Continent, although not expressed in these terms. This 
consequentialist approach is consistent with contract law’s development of the 
innominate term. By contrast, Mance LJ’s attempt in The Aegeon to limit the insurer’s 
rights by the materiality standard for fraudulent devices has provided an insufficiently 
high threshold. Indeed, it is difficult to see, on a wide reading (eg, by including as 
material anything that distracts the insurer from the genuine issues), how it could ever 
realistically be failed. The problem with imposing such strict duties on voluntary 
conduct is not simply the hard cases that ensue, but at some stage the volunteers will be 
advised not to cooperate, at least not on these terms.  
It can be said of this paper that it does not provide a clear alternative to the forfeiture 
rule. Given the entrenched nature of the current rule, we have indeed set our mind to 
displacing that, rather than building our own version. It is a dissent. Following the 
enactment of the Insurance Act 2015, our preference for a statutory discretion (akin to 
the Australian Insurance Contracts Act 1984, s.56) now seems to be in vain. Failing that, 
we would settle for a materiality standard at the level envisaged by Longmore LJ in The 
Mercandian Continent: conduct sufficiently prejudicial that it would justify repudiation 
of a contract. To those who suggest that this provides a conduit for the enforcement of 
fraud by the courts, we reply: let insurers contract for explicit duties on insureds at 
claims and for further protection. We echo here the words of Mance LJ in Friends 
Provident Life & Pensions Ltd v Sirius International Insurance:186 
 
 
 
184. Often referred to in the literature as “presentation”.  
185. An excellent review of English contract law’s troubled relationship with external values is found in D 
Campbell, “Good Faith and the Ubiquity of the ‘Relational’ Contract” (2014) 77 MLR 460, 481–484. 
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“If insurers consider that they want or need such protection, they can and should try to express it in 
their insurance contracts and see if insureds and the broking market will accept it. … English 
insurance law is strict enough as it is in insurers’ favour. I see no reason to make it stricter.” 
 
 
 
VI. CONCLUSION: RECONSIDERING THE FUNDAMENTAL  
BASIS OF FORFEITURE 
 
We accept that the deterrence of fraud is an important goal for courts and policymakers, and 
society more widely, but our scepticism lies in the fact that it appears as an overarching 
concern for insurance courts only. Fraudsters are in general treated much more generously in 
other areas of the law; compare, for example, the owners in The DC Merwestone with the 
employee who submits an inflated expenses claim or the fraudulent personal injury 
claimant.187 In light of our critique of deterrence, the judicial sympathy for a contextual basis 
of the law on illegality and personal injury fraud renders the steadfast grip on the forfeiture 
rule difficult to justify. This, as we have explained, cannot be because deterrence is any more 
important in this sphere. Instead, we suggest consideration of a remedial framework which 
responds to the severity of the fraud, to replace the strict nature of the current model. In light 
of the Insurance Act 2015, the construction of a proportionate framework can now only be a 
matter for the courts, and we suggest that the Human Rights Act 1998 and consideration of 
the employment sphere each provides a sufficient means of achieving this. Given the broader 
role of the Supreme Court justice as “legal architect”, it is hoped that Lord Mance has given 
his fellow justices copies of Kahneman’s Thinking Fast and Slow, with its cautionary tales of 
“hearts ruling heads”. Perhaps then the deterrence of fraud can be informed by the wealth of 
social science literature on the causes of fraud, rather than bending to instinctive reactions, 
which do little to deter in practice. 
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